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Anthony Corso1, and Mykel J. Kochenderfer1
Abstract— An open problem for autonomous driving is how
to validate the safety of an autonomous vehicle in simulation.
Automated testing procedures can find failures of an au-
tonomous system but these failures may be difficult to interpret
due to their high dimensionality and may be so unlikely as to
not be important. This work describes an approach for finding
interpretable failures of an autonomous system. The failures
are described by signal temporal logic expressions that can be
understood by a human, and are optimized to produce failures
that have high likelihood. Our methodology is demonstrated for
the safety validation of an autonomous vehicle in the context
of an unprotected left turn and a crosswalk with a pedestrian.
Compared to a baseline importance sampling approach, our
methodology finds more failures with higher likelihood while
retaining interpretability.
I. INTRODUCTION
A major challenge for autonomous driving is how to
validate the safety of an autonomous vehicle (AV) before
deploying it on the road. A common practice is to test
the AV using an adversarial driving simulator that controls
stochastic disturbances in the environment over time to find
failures [1]–[3]. The disturbance trajectories that lead to fail-
ure are often high-dimensional and can therefore be difficult
to interpret. In this work, we try to address this problem
by developing a technique for interpretable black-box safety
validation. We seek to generate descriptions of disturbance
trajectories that lead to failure so that the descriptions may
be used to understand weaknesses in the autonomous sys-
tem and produce many related failure examples for further
analysis.
The safety validation problem we study involves finding
failures of an autonomous system (system-under-test or SUT)
that operates in a stochastic environment. The state of the
SUT and the environment is s ∈ S and the disturbances
x ∈ X are stochastic changes in the environment that can
influence the SUT. For autonomous driving, the state is
the pose of each agent and the internal state of the AV
policy, while the disturbances may include the behavior
of other drivers, the behavior of pedestrians, and sensor
noise. A disturbances trajectory x = {x1, . . . , xN} has a
probability p(x) which models the stochastic elements of the
environment. The set of all trajectories that end in a failure
of the AV is denoted E and x ∈ E means that the sequence
of disturbances x causes the SUT to fail.
Black-box falsification techniques try to find any x such
that x ∈ E. Falsification can be cast as an optimization
problem over the space of disturbance trajectories [4] which
can be solved using various optimization algorithms [5]–[9].
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These approaches do not scale well when x is very high-
dimensional and failure examples might be extremely rare
according to p(x). Adaptive stress testing [1], [2], [10],
[11] tries to find the most likely failure by maximizing
p(x) subject to x ∈ E and frames the falsification problem
as a Markov decision process so it can be solved using
reinforcement learning. Failures can also be found using
importance sampling [12]–[15], or with rapidly exploring
random trees [16]. Unlike the previous approaches, or work
seeks to find an interpretable description of the failure
trajectory x rather than just a single example.
For an algorithm to be interpretable, its results must be
readily understood by a human. Interpretable models must
choose an output representation that is sufficiently expressive
to compactly convey the desired information while having
direct mappings to words and concepts. Decision trees use
a branching set of rules to classify data [17] or represent
a reinforcement learning policy [18]. Simple mathematical
expressions can be used for regression [19], governing equa-
tion discovery [20] and as a reinforcement learning pol-
icy [21]. Signal temporal logic (STL) is well-suited for high-
dimensional time series data [22], [23] because it describes
logical relationships between temporal variables and has a
natural-language description that is easily understood.
Our approach seeks to find a description ϕ such that any
disturbance trajectory that satisfies the description will cause
the SUT to fail. Additionally, we want to search for the most
likely failure example by maximizing the probability of the
failure trajectories. These goals can be combined into the
optimization problem
max
ϕ
Ex∼p(x|x∈ϕ)[p(x)] s.t. x ∈ E (1)
where p(x | x ∈ ϕ) is the probability density of disturbance
trajectories that satisfy the description. Taking inspiration
from related work, we will represent ϕ using STL and
perform the optimization using genetic programming.
We use our approach to find the most-likely failures of
an autonomous vehicle in two driving scenarios: 1) An
unprotected left turn scenario with a small discrete distur-
bance space, and 2) a crosswalk scenario with a continuous
and high-dimensional disturbance space to show that the
approach scales. The first scenario assumes that the distur-
bances are independent while the second scenario models the
joint distribution over disturbance trajectories as a Gaussian
process. In both scenarios, we find interpretable failure
modes of the AV for several different initial conditions.
Additionally, our approach finds an order of magnitude
more failures than the importance sampling baseline and the
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failures that are found have a much higher likelihood. The
main contributions of this paper are:
1) An approach for generating interpretable trajectory
descriptions.
2) Application of the approach to finding the most likely
failures of an autonomous vehicle.
3) A comparison to an existing validation approach for
two driving scenarios.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
necessary technical background for our approach. Section III
gives details of the algorithm. Section IV describes two
experiments with safety validation of autonomous vehicles.
Section V concludes and gives future direction.
II. BACKGROUND
This section discusses signal temporal logic, context-free
grammars, genetic programming for expression optimization,
and Gaussian processes.
A. Signal Temporal Logic
Signal temporal logic (STL) is a logical formalism that is
used to describe the behavior of time-varying systems [24],
[25]. STL uses the basic logical propositions and (∧), or
(∨), and not (¬), as well as temporal propositions such as
eventually (♦) and always (). Temporal logic operators are
evaluated on series of Booleans. Continuous and discrete
time series data are converted to Boolean statements using
the comparison operators ≤, ≥, and =. A time series x
satisfies an STL expression ψ if ψ(x) evaluates to TRUE.
STL expressions can also include an explicit dependence
on time. The proposition [t1,t2](x < 10) means always
x < 10 for t ∈ [t1, t2] and ♦[t1,t2](x = 13) means eventually
x = 13 for t ∈ [t1, t2]. The flexibility of STL and the ease
with which STL expressions can be converted into natural
language can make it a suitable choice for interpretable
modeling of heterogeneous time series [22], [23].
B. Context-Free Grammar
A context-free grammar is a set of rules that define a
formal language such as STL. Each rule in the grammar
is composed of an output type and a set of inputs consisting
of types and symbols. To generate an expression, a starting
type is chosen and types are recursively expanded until only
symbols remain.
The grammar for the STL language described in section II-
A is given in eq. (2) for a single time series variable x. The
type B is used for Boolean scalars, S is for Boolean series,
T is for time, and X is for values of x. The logical operators
apply element-wise on series. The symbol | separates rules
on the same line and : indicates a range of symbols. In this
work, time is discrete and the variable x may be discrete or
continuous. When x is continuous, X is sampled uniformly
at random in the range [xmin, xmax].
B 7→ B ∧ B | B ∨ B | ¬B | [T,T](S) | ♦[T,T](S)
T 7→ 0 : Tmax
S 7→ S ∧ S | S ∨ S | ¬S | x ≤ X | x ≥ X | x = X
X 7→ [xmin, xmax]
(2)
C. Genetic Programming
Genetic programming is a population-based optimization
technique for trees such as expressions generated from a
grammar [26], [27]. Trees are evaluated according to a fitness
function to determine the quality of an individual. To start the
optimization, a population of Npop trees is randomly sam-
pled. Then, the following operations are performed randomly
at each iteration (or generation) until convergence:
• Reproduction: The fittest tree is selected from a subset
of the population and progresses to the next iteration.
• Mutation: A random node in the tree is replaced with
a random tree of the same type from the grammar.
• Crossover: Two individuals are selected at random and
mixed to create a child. A random subtree from the first
individual replaces a random node of the same type in
the second individual.
D. Gaussian Processes
A Gaussian process [28] is a stochastic process where
any finite set of sample points t = [t1, . . . , tm] have
values x = [x1, . . . , xm] that are distributed according to
a multivariate normal distribution x ∼ N (µ(t),K(t, t))
where µi(t) = µ(ti) for mean function µ and Kij(t, t′) =
k(ti, t
′
j) for kernel function k. A common choice for k is the
squared exponential kernel with variance σ2 and character-
istic length ` given by k(t1, t2) = σ2exp
(−(t1 − t2)2/2`2).
One strength of Gaussian processes is the ability to easily
compute a posterior distribution after observing some values
xo at observation points to.
To apply linear constraints on a Gaussian process, we
use the procedure of Jidling et al. [29] where they apply a
transformation to sample points from a truncated multivariate
normal distribution. Sampling from a truncated multivariate
distribution can be done efficiently with the minimax tilt-
ing approach [30]. For notational convenience, we write a
Gaussian process with mean µ, kernel k, observed points
xo, lower bound linear constraints l and upper bound linear
constraints u as GP(µ, k,xo, l,u).
III. METHODS
This section provides details for our approach to inter-
pretable validation. We overview the validation algorithm and
then discuss how expressions and trajectories are sampled.
A. Algorithm Overview
The procedure for interpretable safety validation is sum-
marized in algorithm 1. The algorithm takes as input a gram-
mar GSTL that specifies the STL rules (eq. (2)) and a cost
function c which can be any function that leads to failures
when minimized. In this work, c(x) = −p(x)1{x ∈ E} so
that trajectories that end in failure and have high-likelihood
correspond with low cost. A population of expressions ϕj are
sampled from the grammar (line 2) and then the algorithm
iterates until the computational budget is exhausted. On each
iteration, the cost for each expression ϕj is computed by
evaluating c(x) for N trajectories that satisfy ϕj and taking
the average (line 6). The details of how trajectories are
sampled are given in sections III-C and III-D. Then, we
perform the operations of genetic programming: reproduc-
tion, crossover and mutation, to evolve the population of
expressions to a lower cost (lines 7 to 9). After looping,
return the highest performing description (line 10).
Algorithm 1 Interpretable Validation
1: function INTERPRETABLEVALIDATION(GSTL, c)
2: Sample {ϕ1, . . . , ϕM} from GSTL
3: loop
4: for each expression ϕj
5: Sample {x1, . . . ,xN} from p(x) s.t. xi ∈ ϕj
6: cϕj ← 1N
∑N
i=1 c(xi)
7: Select expressions {ϕ1, . . . , ϕM} based on cϕj
8: Crossover expressions
9: Mutate expressions
10: return best ϕj
B. Sampling Expressions
Expressions need to be sampled from the STL gram-
mar during the initialization of the genetic programming
optimization scheme and during the mutation procedure.
Expressions are constructed as a tree of nodes where each
node is a rule from the grammar. Each node in the expression
tree is recursively expanded by choosing a rule uniformly at
random from the grammar until each leaf has a terminal
rule. A maximum depth of 10 is imposed on all expressions
to keep them from becoming too large. The grammar is
defined and sampled from using ExprRules.jl. For a more
detailed analysis on sampling expressions from a grammar
see Kochenderfer and Wheeler [26].
C. Converting Expressions into Stochastic Constraints
To generate trajectories that satisfy an expression, one
could sample x ∼ p(x) until a sample satisfies the given
expression. If the expression places very restrictive require-
ments on the trajectory, however, then a large number of
samples would be required to find one that satisfies the
expression. To mitigate this problem, we construct linear con-
straints that, when imposed on samples from p(x), enforce
the satisfaction of the STL expression. There are efficient
algorithms for sampling from certain linearly-constrained
distributions [29], which makes this approach tractable.
There are many different constraints that could enforce a
time series to satisfy an STL expression. We seek to find the
set of constraints that impose the minimum restriction on the
time series while enforcing STL satisfaction, and choose one
of these constraints at random. The procedure for sampling
the minimally-restrictive constraints is given in algorithm 2.
The algorithm takes as input an expression ex, an initially
empty vector V to store the linear constraints, and the desired
output of the expression out. Depending on the type of the
expression, out can be a scalar or a vector whose values can
be TRUE, FALSE, or ARBITRARY, where ARBITRARY means
that there is no restriction placed on what the expression
TABLE I: The minimally-restrictive set of subexpression
outputs for the desired output of a parent expression. T, F,
and A are TRUE, FALSE, and ARBITRARY. To place the
minimal amount of restriction on the time series, an output
of ARBITRARY is used whenever possible.
Expression Output Subexpression Output
∧ TRUE (T, T)
FALSE (F, A) or (A, F)
∨ TRUE (T, A) or (A, T)
FALSE (F, F)
¬ TRUE F
FALSE T
[t1,t2]
TRUE
[ A, . . ., T, . . . , T︸ ︷︷ ︸
[t1,t2]
, A, . . . ]
FALSE
[ A, . . ., F
↑
t∈[t1,t2]
, A, . . . ]
♦[t1,t2]
TRUE
[ A, . . ., F
↑
t1
, . . . , T
↑
t∈[t1,t2]
, A, . . . ]
FALSE
[ A, . . ., F, . . . , F︸ ︷︷ ︸
[t1,t2]
, A, . . . ]
should evaluate to. If the expression is a leaf (e.g. a direct
comparison such as x < 3), then the expression and the
output are stored as a pair to the vector of constraints (line
3). If the expression is not a leaf, then it can be decomposed
into subexpressions (e.g. x < 3 ∨ x > 1 yields two
subexpressions x < 3 and x > 1) (line 5). The output of
each of those subexpressions is determined by the output
of their parent expression (line 6). A set of subexpression
outputs is sampled from the rules shown in table I. For each
subexpression, the algorithm recurses (line 8) until all leaf
nodes of the original expression are converted to constraints.
The next section describes how to use those constraints to
sample a disturbance trajectory from certain distributions.
Algorithm 2 Sampling constraints for STL satisfaction
1: function SAMPLECONSTRAINTS(ex, out, V )
2: if ex is a leaf
3: push(V , (ex, out))
4: else
5: E ← SubExpressions(ex)
6: O ← SubExpressionOutputs(ex, out)
7: for i in 1:length(E)
8: SampleConstraints(E[i], O[i], V )
D. Sampling Multivariate Time Series with Constraints
Let
[
x(1), . . . ,x(m)
]
be a multivariate times series with m
samples of x ∈ Rn. Suppose we are given a set of constraint
functions l,u : R→ Rn such that lj(t) ≤ xj(t) ≤ uj(t) and
lj(t) ≤ uj(t) for j = 1, . . . , n. The most general model of
this times series is given by the joint probability distribution
p(x(1), . . . ,x(m)) s.t. l(ti) ≤ x(i) ≤ u(ti) (3)
where ti corresponds to the time of the sample point x(i).
The model p captures the correlations in the data over time
and between variables.
If time series samples and components of x are indepen-
dent, then the probability distribution decomposes to
p(x(1), . . . ,x(m)) =
m∏
i=1
p(x(i)) =
m∏
i=1
n∏
j=1
p(x
(i)
j ). (4)
If the probability model is uniform, the jth component of
the sample at ti is distributed as
x
(i)
j ∼ U(lj(ti), uj(ti)) (5)
If the probability model of the jth component is normal with
mean µ˜j and variance σ˜2j , then the sample at ti is distributed
as a truncated normal distribution
x
(i)
j ∼ T N lj(ti),uj(ti)(µ˜j , σ˜2j ) (6)
When the time series is jointly distributed as a Gaussian
process with mean function µj and kernel kj for the jth
component, then samples are distributed according to[
x
(1)
j , . . . , x
(m)
j
]
∼ GP
(
µj , kj , lj(t
o), lj(t
c), uj(t
c)
)
(7)
The inequality constraints are separated into two sets: to
where lj(to) = uj(to) and tc where lj(tc) < uj(tc).
IV. EXPERIMENTS
This section describes experiments where interpretable
safety validation is used to find failures of an autonomous
vehicle in two driving scenarios: 1) an unprotected left turn,
and 2) a vehicle approaching a crosswalk with a pedestrian.
The system-under-test is an AV (referred to as the ego vehi-
cle) that follows a modified version of the intelligent driver
model (IDM) [31], a vehicle-following algorithm that tries
to drive at a specified velocity while avoiding collisions with
leading vehicles or pedestrians. The IDM is parameterized by
a desired velocity of 29 m/s, a minimum spacing of 5 m, a
maximum acceleration of 3 m/s2 and a comfortable braking
deceleration of 2 m/s2. In the left-turn scenario, the IDM is
augmented with a rules-based algorithm for navigating the
intersection that predicts the behavior of oncoming traffic
based on turn signals and right-of-way norms.
In both driving scenarios, we aim to find the most likely
failure (collision between the ego vehicle and another agent)
of the SUT based on the models of the environment. The
performance of our algorithm is evaluated on three metrics:
1) The rate of failures generated (evaluated from 500 trials),
2) the likelihood of the failure trajectories (evaluated from
500 failure trajectories), and 3) the interpretability of the STL
expression. As a baseline, we use importance sampling to
make finding failures more likely. The proposal distribution
is chosen for each scenario separately.
In all of the experiments, the STL optimization was
performed with genetic programming with a population of
1000 individuals over 30 generations, implemented in Ex-
prOptimization.jl. The probability of reproduction was 0.3,
the probability of crossover was 0.3 and the probability of
mutation was 0.4.
A. Scenario 1: Unprotected Left Turn
As shown in figs. 1 to 3, the first scenario is an interaction
between the ego vehicle (in blue), which is attempting to
turn left, and one adversarial vehicle (in red) which is
initially driving straight through the intersection. The yellow
dot represents a turn signal. The adversarial vehicle has
a discretized disturbance space with seven possible distur-
bances: no disturbance ∅, a medium slowdown dmed, a
major slowdown dmaj, a medium speedup amed, a major
speedup amaj, toggle turn signal S, and toggle turn intention
L. The medium accelerations are ±1.5 m/s2 and the major
accelerations are ±3.0 m/s2. The disturbances are added to
the normal behavior of the vehicle dictated by the IDM,
and have an associated probability with larger disturbances
being less likely. The medium disturbances have probability
1e−2, the major disturbances (including toggling turn signal
and turn intention) have probability 1e−3. The rest of the
probability (0.976) is assigned to no disturbance. Under this
probability model, failures are very unlikely to occur so we
use importance sampling (IS) as a baseline. The proposal
distribution was chosen to be uniform over the disturbances,
a choice that significantly increases the likelihood of failure.
The simulation timestep was set to ∆t = 0.18 s.
Three initial conditions of the left-turn (LT) scenario were
investigated. Each initial condition is represented by the tuple
(sego, vego, sadv, vadv) where s is the distance from the
center of the intersection and v is the vehicle velocity. The
initial conditions and corresponding nominal behavior of the
ego vehicle are given below.
• LT1: (15 m, 9 m/s, 29 m, 10 m/s). The nominal behav-
ior is for the ego vehicle to take the left turn before the
other vehicle arrives at the intersection.
• LT2: (15 m, 9 m/s, 29 m, 20 m/s). The nominal behav-
ior is for the ego vehicle to wait for other vehicle to
pass through the intersection before turning left.
• LT3: (19 m, 9 m/s, 43 m, 29 m/s). The nominal behav-
ior is the same as in LT2.
The results for the three initial conditions are shown in
table II. Trajectories that were sampled from the optimal
STL expression produced at least an order of magnitude
more failures than the rollouts from the IS distribution. This
means that once the optimal expression is computed, it is
very effective at generating failures. Additionally, we see that
the average disturbance probability is much higher for the in-
terpretable failures than for the IS failures. The interpretable
failures place minimal constraints on the trajectories so many
of the disturbances are selected according to the true model
of the environment, leading to the relatively high likelihood
of the trajectory. With importance sampling, the distribution
causes rare disturbances to be chosen with regularity, even
when they are not critical for causing a failure. Many rare
events cause the IS trajectories to have very low likelihood.
Finally, we can interpret the generated failure expressions.
For LT1, we see that the optimal STL expression enforces a
major acceleration in the first two timesteps of the simula-
tion. This acceleration allows the adversarial vehicle to just
TABLE II: Comparing interpretable validation (IV) to im-
portance sampling (IS) for three different initial conditions
of the left-turn scenario.
Method Fail Rate Likelihood Expression
IV (LT1) 0.968± 0.003 0.78± 0.049 [0,.36]amaj
IS (LT1) 0.008± 0.008 0.11± 0.099 -
IV (LT2) 0.994± .001 0.82± 0.049 [0,0]B
IS (LT2) 9.20± 3.63 0.15± 0.13 -
IV (LT3) 0.164± 0.004 0.75± 0.029 [0,.36]B ∨ dmaj
IS (LT3) 0.0018± 0.0005 0.15± 0.13 -
Fig. 1: Collision for LT1 at t = (1.08 s, 1.98 s).
reach the ego vehicle as it completes its left turn as shown
in fig. 1. The ego vehicle initiated the turn based on the
initial velocity of the other vehicle and did not predict such
a significant speedup. For LT2, the generated expression has
the adversarial vehicle toggle its turn signal but continue
straight through the intersection as shown in fig. 2. The
ego vehicle expects the adversarial vehicle to turn, so it
initiates the left turn and causes a collision. Lastly, for LT3,
the generated expression has the adversary either turn on
its turn signal or perform a major deceleration in the first
two timesteps of the simulation (fig. 3) leading to a similar
failure as in LT2. From these experiments, we conclude that
our approach is able to find interpretable expressions that
reliable produce likely failures of the SUT.
B. Scenario 2: Pedestrian Crossing
As shown in figs. 4 and 5, the second driving scenario
has an autonomous vehicle approach a crosswalk while a
pedestrian tries to cross, as done by Koren et al. [1]. The dis-
turbances are the pedestrian acceleration (ax, ay), the sensor
noise on pedestrian position (nx, ny), and the sensor noise
on the pedestrian velocity (nvx , nvy ). The sensor noise is
modeled as independent samples from a zero-mean Gaussian
with standard deviations σpos for the position noise in both
directions and σvel for the velocity noise in both directions.
The pedestrian acceleration in both directions was modeled
Fig. 2: Collision for LT2 at t = (0.72 s, 1.26 s).
Fig. 3: Collision for LT3 at t = (0.90 s, 1.62 s).
TABLE III: Comparing interpretable validation (IV) to im-
portance sampling (IS) for two different models of the
pedestrian crosswalk scenario.
Method Fail Rate Log-Likelihood Expression
IV (PC1) 1.0± 0.0 9.4e−3± 0.0 (ax = 0.019
∧ ay = −0.026)
IS (PC1) 0.13± 0.04 5.2e−32± 5.2e−31 N/A
IV (PC2) 1.0± 0.0 1.3e−23± 7.4e−39 (ax = −0.32
∧ ay = −0.27
∧ nvy = 0.26)
IS (PC2) 0.08± 0.01 6.8e−56± 6.8e−55 N/A
as a zero-mean Gaussian process with a squared-exponential
kernel. The characteristic length was chosen as t = 0.4 s so
that the pedestrian cannot change acceleration too quickly.
The standard deviation of the kernel is σacc. The importance
sampling distribution used the same disturbances models but
doubled the standard deviation parameters to make larger
disturbances more likely, and increase the failure rate). The
comparisons in the STL expressions were sampled uniformly
from [−2 m/s2, 2 m/s2] for acceleration, [−1 m, 1 m] for
position noise, and [−2 m/s, 2 m/s] for velocity noise.
For these experiments, the vehicle starts 35 m to the left of
the crosswalk travelling at 11.7 m/s and the pedestrian starts
4 m below the center of the lane, moving at 1.5 m/s to cross
the street. The simulation timestep was set to ∆t = 0.2. The
correct behavior for the ego vehicle is to come to a safe stop
before the crosswalk as the pedestrian crosses. The difference
between pedestrian crosswalk (PC) scenarios is in the choice
of probability parameters. The first set of parameters (PC1)
makes pedestrian motion more volatile than sensor noise with
σacc = 1 m/s
2, σpos = 0.2 m, σvel = 0.5 m/s2. The second
set (PC2) causes the noise to be a larger factor with σacc =
1 m/s2, σpos = 1 m, σvel = 1 m/s2.
The results of the experiments are shown in table III. In
scenario PC1 and PC2, our approach found STL expres-
sions that produced failures 100% of the time, an order of
magnitude larger than the importance sampling approach.
Additionally, the failures found via STL expressions had
much higher likelihood than those found using importance
sampling. In PC1 we see that the optimal STL expression
prescribes a specific acceleration for the pedestrian that
causes the pedestrian to enter the street and hit the car right
as the car passes by the crosswalk, as shown in fig. 4. Note
that the actual pedestrian position and orientation is shown in
red and the vehicle’s perceived position and orientation is in
gray. In PC2, the expression also includes some prescribed
noise that causes the AV to misjudge the location of the
pedestrian as shown in fig. 5. We conclude from these results
that our approach performs well with continuous disturbance
spaces and complex probability models. It is able to find
STL expressions that reliable produce likelier failures than
the importance sampling baseline.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented an approach for the interpretable safety
validation of an autonomous system based on signal temporal
Fig. 4: Collision for PC1 t = (1.6 s, 3.0 s).
Fig. 5: Collision for PC2 t = (2.4 s, 3.2 s).
logic. The approach uses genetic programming to optimize
an STL expression so that it describes disturbances trajec-
tories that cause an autonomous system to fail. We demon-
strated the approach on two autonomous driving scenarios
with discrete and continuous disturbance spaces. We also
demonstrated that the technique works in the simple case
of disturbances that are independent at each timestep, and
in the more complex situation where the disturbances are
jointly distributed as a Gaussian process. Compared to an
importance sampling baseline, our approach found an order
of magnitude more failures of the autonomous vehicle and
those failures had a higher likelihood. The failure descrip-
tions helped identify flaws in the autonomoous vehicle under
test. Future work will include techniques for ensuring good
coverage of the disturbance space, improved optimization
techniques, and more complex simulators.
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